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THE UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT: WHAT IT WILL
MEAN FOR THE PUTATIVE FATHER
IN CALIFORNIA
In recent years the issue of the rights of out-of-wedlock children1
has reached the courts with increasing frequency, and many commenta-
tors have been persuaded of the need to bring the laws pertaining to
these children more closely in line with contemporary social attitudes.2
Although the subject is not widely regarded as a matter of grave public
concern, the number of persons affected by this litigation is not insub-
stantial. In California alone a total of 12.6 percent of all children born
in 1970 were the children of unmarried parents; in the Black communi-
ty 42.3 percent were born out of wedlock.' The implications for public
welfare and aid to dependent children programs are obvious where so
many homes are potentially fatherless and mothers must bear the eco-
nomic and emotional costs of rearing children alone. Not to be over-
looked are the social and psychological ramifications of depriving chil-
dren and parents of opportunities to establish lasting relationships.4
The person most often overlooked in discussions of the "illegitima-
cy problem" is the father. Until quite recently, his rights vis-a-vis his
children have gone virtually unrecognized. Too often, it was simply
assumed that he had little interest in his children and no commitment to
caring for them. Now, however, a growing number of these fathers are
seeking to define and enforce their affirmative rights to participate in
their children's futures.
1. With implementation of the Uniform Parentage Act, the terms "legitimate"
and "illegitimate" should be without legal significance. Accordingly, where possible, less
pejorative terms, such as "out-of-wedlock" and "nonmarital" will be employed to describe
children of unmarried parents.
2. See, e.g., Marcus, Equal Protection: The Custody of the Illegitimate Child,
11 J. FAMU.Y L 1 (1971); Lippert, The Need for a Clarification of the Putative
Father's Legal Rights, 8 1. FAMILY L. 398 (1968); Note, Father of an Illegitimate Child
-His Right to Be Heard, 50 MINN. L. REv. 1071 (1966).
3. SrATE OF CALiFORNIA, Dm"T OF PumLIC HEALTH, VrrAL STATISTICS OF CAL-
rFoRNI 42 (1970).
4. See generally H. KRAusE, ILLEGITMcY: LAw AND SOCIAL PoLIcY (1971).
Professor Krause has been writing on the topic of illegitimacy for a number of years,
and his article, Bringing the Bastard into the Great Society-A Proposed Uniform Act
on Legitimacy, 44 TEXAS L REV. 829 (1966), was instrumental in prompting the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to undertake a study of the
subject. UNU'oRm PARENTAGE AcT, Prefatory Note at 3.
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Responding to a changing social and legal environment, the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1973
adopted the Uniform Parentage Act, which was subsequently approved
by the American Bar Association.5 The act, in modified form, was
passed by the California legislature in September 1975, and became
effective January 1, 1976.6 This note will explore the act with a view
toward determining how the status of unwed fathers is changed thereby
and what problems may be anticipated from the new legislation.
Initially, however, a brief historical summary of the common law
tradition from which present laws evolved will be presented, followed by
a consideration of California's legislative and judicial treatment of the
nonmarital family prior to enactment of the Uniform Act. Finally, the
act itself will be reviewed and an attempt will be made to define its
strengths and weaknesses.
From Common Law Origins to Stanley v. Illinois
Traditionally, nonmarital parents have been viewed with righteous
indignation by legislatures and courts. At common law, the "sins" of
the parents were visited upon their children with a vengeance. The
child of a nonmarital union was a legal nonentity; he was variously
known as filius nullius, "the son of no one," or filius populi, "the son of
the people."7 He was considered a ward of the parish, and his parents,
therefore, had no legal relationship with him and no obligation to
provide for his support." The child had no inheritance rights with
respect to either parent, and only the issue of his body could be his
heirs.9 No statutes provided for legitimation of the child by the subse-
quent intermarriage of his parents or by any means other than a special
act of Parliament.10 Since adoption was unknown at common law, the
child was unable even to acquire foster parents. 1
The first change in the status of out-of-wedlock children came with
the enactment of statutes requiring that both parents support their
5. Krause, The Uniform Parentage Act, 8 FAMILY L.Q. 1 (1974).
6. Cal. Stat. 1975, ch. 1244, § 11, at - (codified at CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 7000-18
(West Supp. 1976)). At the time of this writing, the Uniform Act had also been
adopted in Hawaii and North Dakota. Hawaii Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 184 (Supp. 1975);
N.D. Stat. 1975, ch. 130, § 1.
7. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *459.
8. S. SCHATKIN, DISPUTED PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS § 1.08, at 1-26, 1-27 (4th rev.
ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as SCHATKIN].
9. According to Blackstone, "The incapacity of a bastard consists principally in
this, that he cannot be heir to anyone, neither can he have heirs, but of his own body.
." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *459.
10. A child conceived out of wedlock could be legitimated only if his parents in-
termarried prior to his birth. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *454-55.
11. SCHATKIN, supra note 8, § 1.08, at 1-26.
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illegitimate offspring.12 Such statutes were intended to remove from the
parish the financial burden of caring for the children. To the drafters
of these statutes, the child's welfare was of secondary importance, and,
as a result, the legal status of nonmarital children remained unaltered.
Not until the nineteenth century did the law begin to recognize the
unwed mother's legal right to custody of her child.' 3
The common law doctrine of filius nullius was generally adopted
by the American states.' 4 Initially, the putative father was treated as
having at most a moral obligation to provide support for his child. He
owed no legal duties to the child and had no custodial or other rights
with regard to him.15 Gradually, however, many jurisdictions retreated
from this position and imposed a statutory duty upon the father to
render financial assistance to his children.' 6 More recently, limited
paternal rights of visitation and custody have been recognized by the
courts, although the mother has continued to enjoy primary custodial
rights.' 7 Legitimation statutes, which allow the putative father to alter
the child's status to that of a "legitimate" child by receiving him into his
home and otherwise acknowledging him as his own, now offer a method
for expanding the father's rights. However, this procedure has often
been strictly limited by the courts.' 8 The right of the unwed father to
receive notice of adoption proceedings involving his children has been
almost nonexistent; only the mother's consent to the adoption is statuto-
rily required in most jurisdicitions-unless the father has legitimated the
child.' 9
In the late 1960's and early 1970's, however, the United States
Supreme Court decided a number of cases that conceded certain consti-
tutional rights of "illegitimates" and their parents. In 1968, the Court
rendered two opinions, Levy v. Louisiana" and Glona v. American
12. One such statute was the English Poor Law Act of 1576. SCHATKIN, supra
note 8, § 1.09, at 1-30.
13. ScHATKiN, supra note 8, § 1.08, at 1-28.
14. Note, Legitimation: The Liberal Judicial Trend in California, 19 HAsTINGS
L.J. 232, 233 (1967).
15. Note, Father of An Illegitimate Child-His Right to Be Heard, 50 MINN. L.
RFv. 1071, 1072 (1966).
16. Virtually all states now require that the father support his nonmarital children
to some degree. See generally H. CLARK, THE L.Aw oF DoMESTc RELATIoNS § 5.3
(1968).
17. Tabler, Paternal Rights in the Illegitimate Child: Some Legitimate Com-
plaints on Behalf of the Unwed Father, 11 J. FAMILY L. 231, 242-43 (1971).
18. Id. at 236-37. For a discussion of legitimation statutes, see H. CLARK, THE
LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 5.2 (1968), and Comment, The Emerging Constitutional
Protection of the Putative Father's Parental Rights, 70 MicH. L REv. 1581, 1582 n.6
(1972).
19. 2 AM. JuR. 2D Adoption §§ 25-26 (1962).
20. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
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Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co.,2 which struck down Louisiana's
wrongful death statute on equal protection grounds. In Levy, the Court
found invidious discrimination in the Louisiana statute in its denial of
recovery to nonmarital children for the wrongful death of their mother.
Similarly, the Court in Glona reasoned that no rational basis existed for
the state's refusal to allow the mother of nonmarital children to sue
under the statute for the deaths of those children. While a number of
courts believed these cases required equality between marital and non-
marital children in their legal relationships with both parents,22 there
remained considerable uncertainty as to how these decisions would
affect the child's relationship with his unmarried father.23 The Su-
preme Court itself added to the confusion when in 1971 it announced its
decision in Labine v. Vincent.24 In that case, the Court refused to
extend the principle of Levy to invalidate a law that prohibited a
nonmarital child from inheriting from her intestate father even though
he had acknowledged her as his child. The following year, however,
the Court again reversed its position in two memorable decisions. In
one of these opinions, Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,25 the
Court awarded workmen's compensation benefits to the unacknowl-
edged nonmarital children of a deceased workman, a ruling that
amounted to a complete about-face on the issue of out-of-wedlock
children's rights.26
Perhaps the most celebrated of the 1972 cases dealing with the
rights of unwed fathers was Stanley v. Illinois,27 wherein the Court
21. Id. at 73.
22. See, e.g., Weaks v. Mounter, 88 Nev. 118, 493 P.2d 1307 (1972); Cannon v.
Transamerican Freight Lines, 37 Mich. App. 313, 194 N.W.2d 736 (1971) (both allow-
ing nonmarital children wrongful death actions for the deaths of their fathers); Haley
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 434 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. App. 1968) (extending benefits avail-
able under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Act to employees' nonmarital
children).
23. See generally Krause, Legitimate and Illegitimate Offspring of Levy v. Louisi-
ana-First Decisions on Equal Protection and Paternity, 36 U. Cm. L. REV. 338 (1969).
24. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
25. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
26. In a recent case, however, the Court appears to have reversed itself again in
favor of the position taken in Labine. Matthews v. Lucas, 44 U.S.L.W. 5139 (U.S. June
29, 1976). In Matthews, a legislative classification based upon legitimacy was held not
to be subject to the strict scrutiny test of equal protection. Provisions of the Social Se-
curity Act require nonmarital children to establish eligibility for surviving children's
benefits by proving their dependency on the deceased wage earner-parent. Marital chil-
dren, in contrast, are presumed to be dependent without such proof. In upholding the
law, the Court stated, "Such presumptions in aid of administrative functions, though they
may approximate, rather than precisely mirror, the results that case-by-case adjudication
would show, are permissible under the fifth amendment, so long as that lack of precise
equivalence does not exceed the bounds of substantiality tolerated by the applicable level
of scrutiny." Id. at 5143. Cf. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1972).
27. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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recognized for the first time a putative father's parental rights. Peter
Stanley, petitioner in the case, had never married the mother of his
children although they had lived together intermittently for a period of
eighteen years. When the mother died, the children were separated
from Stanley pursuant to an Illinois statute under which the children of
a nonmarital union automatically became wards of the state upon the
death of their mother. This legislative scheme made no provision for a
hearing to determine the father's fitness and did not require proof of
neglect before the children were removed from their father's care.
In striking down the statute, the Court in Stanley held that due
process entitled the unwed father to a hearing on his fitness as a parent
before a decision regarding custody of his children could be made. The
state's presumption that all unmarried fathers are unsuitable and ne-
glectful parents, said the Court, served only the state's convenience and
failed to protect the fathers' "cognizable and substantial" interest in
retaining custody of their children.2 Such fathers must therefore be
notified of pending actions affecting their parental rights and be given
an opportunity to be heard. The Court further determined that where,
as in the Illinois plan, other parents are provided the opportunity for a
hearing, it is a denial of equal protection if such a hearing is withheld
from unmarried fathers.
Predictably, Stanley provoked a flood of commentary29 and provid-
ed an impetus to states in their efforts to modernize laws dealing with
nonmarital families. California's adoption of the Uniform Parentage
Act was such a response.3" Before considering the act in some detail,
California's statutory and decisional law prior to enactment of the new
legislation will be examined in order to provide background on specific
problems faced by putative fathers. As will be seen, several of these
problems will persist under the new law.
California Law Prior to the Uniform Parentage Act
As is true of the majority of states, California has historically failed
to recognize adequately the rights of the unmarried father in many
instances. While both parents have been required to provide support
for the child,31 the unwed mother has been exclusively entitled to the
28. Id. at 652.
29. See, e.g., Comment, Protecting the Putative Father's Rights After Stanley v,
Illinois: Problems in Implementation, 13 1. FAMILY L. 115 (1973-74); Note, The
"Strange Boundaries" of Stanley: Providing Notice of Adoption to the Unknown Puta-
tive Father, 59 VA. L. REv. 517 (1973).
30. Letter from Senator Anthony C. Beilenson to Sister Bertilie Prus, April 2,
1975, in author's files.
31. CAL. CrV. CODE § 196a (West 1954 & Supp. 1976).
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child's custody, services and earnings." California has been one of a
handful of states that occasionally have allowed the putative father
visitation rights over the objections of the mother,3 3 but this right has
not been consistently granted 4.3  Furthermore, until Stanley, only the
mother's approval was necessary in adoption proceedings, the putative
father's having neither a right to notification nor a right to be heard on
the subject.3 5
Legitimation
The California father has been able to establish rights to his child
where he has "legitimated" him, either by subsequently marrying the
mother 36 or by "adopting" the child pursuant to special statutory provi-
sions set out in Civil Code section 230.17 This section required that the
father publicly acknowledge the child as his, receive him into his family
(with the consent of the father's wife if he was married), and otherwise
treat the child as his own. Compliance with these provisions equalized
the father's rights with those of the mother in regard to custody,
visitation, and adoption.
If the child's mother opposed the putative father's attempt to
conform to the legitimation statute, difficulties often arose, and incon-
sistent interpretations of the prerequisites of section 230 have appeared
in the cases over the years. In Lavell v. Adoption Institute,3" for
32. CAL. CIV. CODE § 197 (West Supp. 1976). Where the mother is dead, the
courts have awarded custody to the unwed father who could demonstrate his fitness.
See, e.g., Guardianship of Smith, 42 Cal. 2d 91, 265 P.2d 888 (1954). In Smith the
court stressed that giving the father custody would lead to legitimation of the children
under former section 230 of the Civil Code. Id. at 94, 265 P.2d at 890. Justice Tray-
nor's concurring opinion illustrates the reluctance of many in the judiciary to extend pa-
rental rights freely to unwed fathers. According to Justice Traynor, before an unwed
father could be adjudged a fit parent, he should first be required to explain why he had
not legitimated his child. 42 Cal. 2d at 98, 265 P.2d at 892-93. See also Note, Cus-
tody: A Dominant Right of the Father of an Illegitimate Child After the Death of the
Mother?, 42 CALIF. L. REv. 514 (1954).
33. See, e.g., Strong v. Owens, 91 Cal. App. 2d 336, 205 P.2d 48 (1949). The
putative father in Strong had been able to establish a close relationship with his child
and had, in fact, probably legitimated him. The court did not discuss the legitimation
issue.
34. Comment, Plight of the Putative Father in California Child Custody Proceed-
ings: A Problem of Equal Protection, 6 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1, 4 (1973). According
to one commentator, visitation has never been granted in any state in a case in which
the father had refused to make support payments. Tabler, Paternal Rights in the Ille-
gitimate Child: Some Legitimate Complaints on Behalf of the Unwed Father, 11 J.
FAMILY L. 231, 233 (1971). For a general discussion of visitation privileges, see 27
OHIO ST. L.J. 738 (1966).
35. CAL. CIV. CODE § 224 (West 1954 & Supp. 1976).
36. Cal. Stat. 1870, ch. 385, § 8, at 531 (repealed 1975).
37. Id. § 9, at 531.
38. 185 Cal. App. 2d 557, 8 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1960).
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example, the court liberally construed the father's obligation to receive
the child into his home. In that case, the mother of a nonmarital child
had been living with the child's father for two years but left his home
shortly before the child was born. The father readily acknowledged his
paternity and attempted to accept the child into his home, but he was
prevented from doing so by the mother, who had chosen to relinquish
the child for adoption. In the father's suit to prevent the adoption, the
court held that he had legitimated the child prior to its birth, having
satisfied the receipt requirement 9 by living with and supporting the
pregnant mother and attempting in good faith to provide a home for the
child. The court's opinion recognized a custodial right in natural
parents, whether they are married or not, that is superior to that of
strangers seeking to adopt a child.40 The Lavell decision seemed to
bode well for the unmarried father.
Subsequent courts, however, did not always embrace a policy
favoring legitimation by the natural father. In a number of more recent
decisions, fathers' claims of constructive compliance with section 230
were rejected.41 Many of these opinions read into section 230 a re-
quirement that the child's mother consent to legitimation; thus, if the
mother refused to allow the father to take the child physically into his
home for a period of time, the father could not accomplish legitima-
tion.
42
39. See note 37 & accompanying text supra.
40. 185 Cal. App. 2d at 560.
41. See, e.g., Adoption of Pierce, 15 Cal. App. 3d 244, 93 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1971)
(unwed father's consent to adoption unnecessary although he had made support pay-
ments and had been granted visitation rights pursuant to a court order); Guardianship
of Truschke, 237 Cal. App. 2d 75, 46 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1965) (unwed father's petition
for guardianship denied although he had publicly acknowledged his child and purchased
clothing and furnishings for her); Adoption of Irby, 226 Cal. App. 2d 238, 37 Cal. Rptr.
879 (1964) (acknowledged father's consent to adoption unnecessary although he had at-
tempted to pay the mother's expenses and provide a home for the child). These cases
were recently overruled by the California Supreme Court. See note 46 & accompanying
text infra.
42. In one case, the father had visited his child a number of times but, because
the mother or a nurse was present during these visits, the court found that there had
been "no relinquishment of complete guardianship control by the mother" and the father
could not therefore meet the statutory requirements. Adoption of Pierce, 15 Cal. App.
3d 244, 93 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1971).
Some courts have apparently felt that extension of rights to unwed fathers would
lead to abuse of the adoption system. A California court of appeal has theorized that
the work of social workers and others involved in the adoption process would be im-
measurably increased if the fathers were allowed to participate in adoptions, and that
any relaxation of Civil Code section 230 would give rise to fraud and coercion by
fathers seeking to profit from the adoption of their children. Adoption of Irby, 226 Cal.
App. 2d 238, 241-42, 37 Cal. Rptr. 879, 882 (1964).
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Stanley paved the way for a challenge to this judge-made require-
ment, and in July 1975, the California Supreme Court spoke to the
issue. In re Richard M.43 was a habeas corpus action by the mother of
an out-of-wedlock child (Richard) to regain custody of the child from
the putative father. Evidence showed that the father had readily ac-
knowledged Richard as his child. Although the mother had not lived
with the father prior to Richard's birth, she and the child had stayed at
his home for about one month after Richard was born. Thereafter, the
father visited Richard frequently, often bringing him to his home for
visits of several days duration. Following one of these visits, the father
refused to return the child to the mother's home, and she instituted this
action. The father argued that he had met the requirements of section
230, thereby legitimating Richard and equalizing his rights and obliga-
tions to the child with those of the mother. Relying on earlier cases,4"
the mother countered that legitimation required the mother's prior
consent and relinquishment of custody.
In upholding the father's right to custody, the court in Richard M.
pointed out that the evidence amply supported a finding of legitimation
under section 230. Refusing to accept the view that maternal consent
was an essential element of legitimation, the court noted:
[Section 230] does not mention the natural mother, does not re-
quire her consent, and does not indicate that the father must ac-
quire custody of the child [through the mother's voluntary relin-
quishment]. Nor do we find any basis for imposing this added
burden upon the father's ability to legitimate his offspring, particu-
larly in light of public policy favoring legitimation.4 5
Prior cases inconsistent with the opinion were disapproved."
The Richard M. holding thus dispensed with any requirement that
the child's mother consent to legitimation. However, as is pointed out
in the following discussion of the Uniform Parentage Act, problems may
persist under the new law because of the court's failure to define clearly
and specifically the degree of physical control of the child that must be
43. 14 Cal. 3d 783, 537 P.2d 363, 122 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1975). The father in Rich-
ard M. advanced the argument that California law violates the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment, as well as article I, section 7 of the California Constitu-
tion, insofar as it denies to fathers of out-of-wedlock children those custody rights en-
joyed by other parents. The court, however, chose to dispose of the custody question
by application of section 230 and refused to reach the constitutional issues.
44. See notes 41-42 & accompanying text supra.
45. 14 Cal. 3d at 796, 537 P.2d at 371, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 539.
46. Id. at 797, 537 P.2d at 371, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 539. Specifically mentioned
were the following: Cheryl Lynn H. v. Superior Ct., 41 Cal. App. 3d 273, 115 Cal. Rptr.
849 (1974); Adoption of Pierce, 15 Cal. App. 3d 244, 93 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1971); Guard-
ianship of Truschke, 237 Cal. App. 2d 75, 46 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1965); Adoption of Irby,
226 Cal. App. 2d 238, 37 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1964). See notes 41 & 42 supra,
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exercised by a father seeking to "receive" a child into his home for
purposes of legitimation.47
Applicable Evidence Code Presumptions
While the holding in Richard M. clarified the rights of nonmarital
fathers on the issue of legitimation, other problems remained with
regard to two presumptions, one rebuttable and one conclusive, con-
tained in the Evidence Code. Codified by the legislature in 1872, these
presumptions have been retained intact through subsequent revisions of
the code, and courts have continued to struggle with their application.
Section 661 of the Evidence Code,4 which came into play when a
husband and wife were not cohabiting, provided that the child of a
woman who was or had been married was presumed to be a legitimate
child of that marriage if born during the marriage or within 300 days of
its termination. While this presumption was rebuttable by clear and
convincing proof, such proof could be offered only by the husband or
wife, by their descendants, or, in certain actions not here relevant, by the
state.49  Cases challenging the presumption of section 661 were general-
ly brought by husbands seeking to avoid support obligations to children
not their own or by wives seeking a declaration of paternity in someone
other than their husbands. A man claiming paternity of such a child
had, by the terms of the statute, no standing to raise the issue; his rights
were entirely dependent upon the actions of those parties designated in
section 661."0
An unwed father's recent challenge to section 661 saw the first step
taken to alter this disadvantaged position. In In re Lisa R.51 evidence
showed that the child (Lisa) was conceived and born while the mother
was living with Victor H. during a separation from her husband. Victor
was listed on the birth certificate and in welfare records as Lisa's
putative father. Following the child's birth the mother returned with
47. See notes 113-19 & accompanying text infra.
48. Cal. Stat. 1965, ch. 299, § 661, at 1297 (repealed 1975). Section 661 read
as follows: "A child of a woman who is or has been married, born during the marriage
or within 300 days after the dissolution thereof, is presumed to be a legitimate child
of that marriage. This presumption may be disputed only by the people of the State
of California in a criminal action brought under Section 270 of the Penal Code or by
the husband or wife, or the descendant of one or both of them. In a civil action, this
presumption may be rebutted only by clear and convincing proof."
While passage of the California legislation incorporating the Uniform Parentage
Act repealed Evidence Code section 661, it continues in effect as the new Civil Code
section 7004(a) (1) of the Uniform Act. See note 87 & accompanying text infra.
49. The state is empowered to bring a criminal action for parental nonsupport of
dependent children. CAL. PEN. CODE § 270 (West 1976).
50. See, e.g., Serway v. Galentine, 75 Cal. App. 2d 86, 170 P.2d 32 (1946).
51. 13 Cal. 3d 636, 532 P.2d 123, 119 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975).
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Lisa to her husband, over Victor's objections. In 1969, at the age of
three, Lisa was removed from her mother's custody and placed in a
foster home as a ward of the court following a finding of neglect and
maternal unfitness. The mother and her husband had both died prior
to the fourth annual review of Lisa's dependency status in juvenile court,
and Victor attempted to offer proof of his paternity in order to establish
his right to custody. The juvenile court determined that under section
661 Victor had no standing to offer proof and that he should therefore
be excluded from the hearing.
In the court of appeal, 52 Victor argued that section 661, as applied
in the lower court, deprived him of due process. The appellate court,
however, reluctantly affirmed the juvenile court order, noting that
"ta]lthough it is called 'rebuttable,' as a practical matter the presump-
tion of section 661 is conclusive upon parties other than those to whom
it extends the right of dispute."53 Victor thus had no standing to assert
his paternity.
Victor carried his case to the California Supreme Court, which
handed down its decision in March 1975." 4 Relying heavily on Stanley,
the court weighed the competing private and state interests. 55 Victor's
private interests arose, the court reasoned, from the fact that he had lived
with Lisa's mother both before and after Lisa's birth, had contributed to
her support, and had visited Lisa when he was able to do so. Also, he
had no other remedy to protect his paternal interest in Lisa. Recogniz-
ing the state's interests in guarding the welfare of children and promot-
ing marriage, the court nevertheless held, "for reasons at least as com-
pelling as those in Stanley, that a presumption which precludes to
appellant in the instant circumstances a right to offer evidence to prove
that he is the father of the minor child is unreasonable, arbitrary and
capricious, and a denial of due process."5
This opinion is in line with both the general policy in the courts
favoring legitimation57 and with the United States Supreme Court's
52. In re Lisa R., 115 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1974), vacated, 13 Cal. 3d 636 (1975).
53. Id. at 862.
54. In re Lisa R., 13 Cal. 3d 636, 532 P.2d 123, 119 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975).
55. The court in Lisa reasoned that, while the state had a legitimate interest in
relieving a child of the stigma of illegitimacy, this did not warrant conclusiveness of the
presumption. The court pointed out that a putative father attempting to establish his
paternity would doubtless intend to legitimate the child. 13 Cal. 3d at 650, 532 P.2d
at 132, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 484. Moreover, in Lisa's case, she would be legitimate regard-
less of the outcome of Victor's suit. Because she was born while her mother was mar-
ried, she would be considered a legitimate child of that marriage if Victor was unsuccess-
ful in rebutting the presumption of section 661. If he succeeded in rebutting the pre-
sumption, Lisa would become a legitimate child of Victor through operation of Civil
Code section 230. 13 Cal. 3d at 648 n.14, 532 P.2d at 131, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
56. 13 Cal. 3d at 651, 532 P.2d at 133, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 485 (emphasis added).
57. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 329 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Hurst
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finding of parental rights in the unwed father in Stanley. It remains to
be seen whether the reasoning in Lisa will be extended to cover the case
in which the mother and her husband are still alive and claiming
custody. 8 Despite this uncertainty, however, the unwed father appears
to have achieved a limited victory where the presumed father has died,
at least in those cases in which he can demonstrate legitimation and a
failure of maternal care.
While the trend toward liberalizing the rights of putative fathers
may indicate that courts will eventually apply the Lisa ruling to all men
desiring to rebut the presumption of section 661, such is not the case
with regard to the conclusive presumption of Evidence Code section
621. This section applies to those cases in which the mother of a child
is cohabiting with her husband. Thus, a child born to a woman living
with her husband is conclusively presumed to be the legitimate child of
the husband. Despite the fact that the trend nationally is away from the
use of conclusive presumptions59 and in the face of increasing criti-
cism,60 the California legislature has consistently reaffirmed section 621.
The state supreme court lent support to this legislative position by
upholding the constitutionality of the presumption, contending that
"[a] conclusive presumption is in actuality a substantive rule of law and
cannot be said to be unconstitutional unless it transcends . . . a power
of the legislature."'"
In implementing section 621, the courts have attempted to narrow
the area to which it must apply. The statute's requirement of cohabita-
tion has been strictly construed to mean the living together of a man and
woman as husband and wife at the time of probable conception.6 2 While
in the original code section impotency of the husband was the only
v. Hurst, 227 Cal. App. 2d 859, 39 Cal. Rptr. 162. See generally Note, Legitimation:
The Liberal Judicial Trend in California, 19 HAsTINGS L.J. 232 (1967).
58. There is some doubt as to whether Lisa will apply in other situations. In its
discussion of the reasons upon which it based its decision, the court in Lisa made several
apparently restrictive references to the "circumstances of the instant case." For exam-
ple, the court stated, "Although a state has a legitimate interest in promoting marriage,
and in furtherance of that policy of not impugning a family unit. . . that policy cannot
be served when the family unit has been dissolved as here by the death not only of the
mother but of the presumed father." 13 Cal. 3d at 650, 532 P.2d at 132, 119 Cal. Rptr.
at 484.
59. Comment, The Presumption of Paternity-Rebuttable or Conclusive, 1971
WASH. U.L.Q. 492, 493.
60. See, e.g., Note, California's Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy: Jackson
v. Jackson and Evidence Code Section 621, 19 HAsriNos L.J. 963 (1968); Comment,
California's Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy-Its Legal Effect and Its Question-
able Constitutionality, 35 S. CAL. L. R.v. 437 (1962).
61. Kusior v. Silver, 54 Cal. 2d 603, 619, 354 P.2d 657, 668, 7 Cal. Rptr. 129,
140 (1960).
62. Estate of McNamara, 181 Cal. 82, 183 P. 552 (1919).
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exception to application of the conclusive presumption,6 over the years
the courts added sterility as a second exception.
6 4
Critics of the conclusive presumption assail it because, practically
speaking, it can and does have the effect of prohibiting introduction of
any rebuttal evidence, regardless of its strength, in actions where the
paternity of a husband who is living with his wife is challenged. The
continued exclusion of blood test evidence in cases to which section 621
applies, despite its proven soundness in determining nonpaternity, has
been particularly controversial.
65
California's adoption in 1953 of a modified version of the Uniform
Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity66 resulted in no change in
the operation of section 621. As drafted by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the Blood Test Act contains a
provision that "[tihe presumption of legitimacy of a child born during
wedlock is overcome if the court finds that the conclusions of the
experts, as disclosed by the evidence based upon the [blood] tests, show
that the husband is not the father of the child."67  The California
version of the Uniform Act omitted that section, prompting courts and
commentators to assume that the legislature intended to affirm the
strong social policy embodied in section 621 of the Evidence Code.6"
63. Prior to enactment of the Uniform Parentage Act, Evidence Code section 621
read as follows: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the issue of a wife co-
habiting with her husband, who is not impotent, is conclusively presumed to be legiti-
mate." CAL. EvID. CODE § 621 (West 1954).
64. Hughes v. Hughes, 125 Cal. App. 2d 781, 786, 271 P.2d 172, 175 (1954).
Dicta in some court opinions has underscored the courts' reluctance to apply section 621
where "the circumstances were such as to render it impossible that [the husband] could
be the father of the child." Estate of Walker, 176 Cal. 402, 410, 168 P. 689, 692
(1917). For example, one early case seemed to pave the way for a "racial difference"
exception where a Caucasian husband and wife had a mulatto child. Estate of Mc-
namara, 181 Cal. 82, 96, 183 P. 552, 557-58 (1919). However, this possibility was
ruled out with some finality in Hess v. Whitsett, 257 Cal. App. 2d 552, 65 Cal. Rptr.
45 (1967). In that case, a child with negroid features and complexion was conclusively
presumed to be the child of a Caucasian couple, despite the wife's admission that she
had had intercourse with the black defendant during the period of conception. The
court in Hess stressed that the operation of the conclusive presumption should not be
subject to judicially created exceptions.
The Code was amended in 1975 to include sterility as one of the exceptions to the
operation of the conclusive presumption. CAL. Evm. CODE § 621 (West 1966 & Supp.
1976).
65. See, e.g., Note, California's Tangled Web: Blood Tests and the Conclusive
Presumption of Legitimacy, 20 STAN. L. REV. 754 (1968).
66. Cal. Stat. 1953, ch. 1426, § 1, at 3013-14, repealed by Cal. Stat. 1965, ch.
299, § 116, at 1363, reenacted by Cal. Stat. 1965, ch. 299, §§ 890-97, at 1321-22 (codi-
fied at CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 890-97 (West 1966)).
67. UNIFORM ACT ON BLOOD TESTS TO DETERMINE PATERNITY § 5.
68. See, e.g., Kusior v. Silver, 54 Cal. 2d 603, 616, 354 P.2d 657, 7 Cal. Rptr.
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Thus, blood tests should be admitted only in those cases to which the
rebuttable presumption of section 661 applies-that is, where the hus-
band and wife are not cohabiting.
There are a few cases under section 621 that have admitted blood
tests into evidence, but they have been circuitously reasoned. Jackson
v. Jackson,69 for example, was a rather unusual case involving a mar-
riage in which the partners cohabited for only four days. When his wife
left him, the husband sued for annulment of the marriage. The wife
countered with an allegation that she was pregnant with the plaintiff-
husband's child, and the husband was ordered to pay support and
maternity expenses to her. Following the child's birth approximately
nine months after termination of cohabitation, the trial court ordered the
husband, wife, and child to submit to blood tests. These tests demon-
strated that the husband could not have fathered the child and he moved
to terminate the support orders, using the tests as evidence. The trial
judge refused to admit the blood tests into evidence and denied his
motion.
On appeal, the California Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
order and held that blood tests were valid as evidence for the limited
purpose of proving that conception, by the husband or by any other
man, did not occur during cohabitation. Justice McComb, who au-
thored the opinion, reasoned that "the husband is entitled to avoid the
operation of the 'conclusive presumption' by proof that although there
was cohabitation it was impossible that the child was conceived during
the period of cohabitation."' 0 Thus, the blood tests were evidence that
the child was not conceived while the husband was having intercourse
with his wife, and the court assumed that the husband would be able to
account for his wife's whereabouts during their brief marriage, thus
proving that she had not had intercourse with any other man while she
was living with her husband. Once it was shown that the child was not
conceived during cohabitation, the rebuttable presumption of section
661 would apply and evidence, including blood tests, would be admissi-
ble on the issue of paternity. 71  The court concluded by noting that
"[w]hen the issue is whether the child could possibly have been con-
129 (1960). Had the legislature adopted section 5 of the Uniform Act it would not
have altered the situation in any case. Evidence Code section 621 applies "notwith-
standing any other provision of law." CAL. Evm. Cone § 621 (West Supp. 1976).
69. 67 Cal. 2d 245, 430 P.2d 289, 60 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1967).
70. Id. at 247, 430 P.2d at 290, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 650.
71. The court's opinion is confusing in that Justice McComb indicated that "if the
husband and wife are not in fact residing together, an exception to the application of
the conclusive presumption arises; the presumption is rebuttable and blood test evidence
may be admitted to rebut it." Id. Actually, if the marriage partners were not living
together, section 621 did not apply at all; instead, section 661 applied.
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ceived during cohabitation, the evidentiary rule is 'any competent evi-
dence relevant to the question is admissible.' "72
Subsequent courts have declined to extend this admission of blood
tests to rebut the presumption of section 621, even when results clearly
impossible by the laws of nature are produced. Commentators have
argued that if the courts on their own could, in the face of clear statutory
language to the contrary, adopt a sterility exception to the presumption,
they should likewise create a blood test exception to prevent unreasona-
ble decisions. 73  To date, no court has undertaken this task and, in light
of past decisions, there is little reason to hope for such a development in
the near future. Critics of section 621 have instead pinned their hopes
on the legislature either to repeal the presumption or to add a blood test
exception to its operation. These hopes were again thwarted when the
conclusive presumption was reaffirmed by the legislature in the bill in-
corporating the Uniform Parentage Act.
The Uniform Parentage Act
The Uniform Parentage Act, as drafted by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, was intended to fulfill the
mandate of Stanley and its predecessors by "providing substantive legal
equality for all children regardless of the marital status of their par-
ents. ' 74  The commissioners developed these new provisions because, in
their view, "the bulk of current law on the subject of children born out
of wedlock is either unconstitutional or subject to grave constitutional
doubt." 5
In substance, the act eliminates reference to legitimacy and illegiti-
macy, and instead refers only to "the parent and child relationship.
1' 6
This is defined as "the legal relationship existing between a child and his
natural or adoptive parents incident to which the law confers or imposes
rights, privileges, duties, and obligations."'7 7  This relationship extends
72. 67 Cal. 2d at 248, 430 P.2d at 291, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 651.
73. See, e.g., Note, California's Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy: Jackson
v. Jackson and Evidence Code Section 621, 19 HASTINGS LJ. 963 (1968); Note, Cali-
fornia's Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy-Its Legal Effect and Its Questionable
Constitutionality, 35 S. CAL. L. REv. 437 (1962); Comment, California's Tangled Web:
Blood Tests and the Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy, 20 STAN. L. REv. 754
(1968).
74. UNIFORM PARENTAGE Acr, Prefatory Note at 5.
75. Id. at4.
76. Because the Supreme Court decisions discussed earlier clearly equalized the
substantive legal position of out-of-wedlock children with that of legitimate children, the
commissioners dispensed with the detailed substantive provisions of their earlier drafts
of the act regarding parental obligations for maintenance, education and support of non-
marital children. Id. at 5.
77. Id. § 1.
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to every parent and child without reference to the parents' marital
status.
78
The remainder of the act deals with the procedural aspects of
distinguishing persons against whom the child's rights to support, inher-
itance, death benefits and the like may be asserted. Provisions detail
the methods for ascertaining the identity of the child's father.79  To
accommodate the rare case in which dispute arises regarding the mother's
identity, a procedure for determining the existence of the mother and
child relationship is also included. s0
The history of the recent legislative change in California can be
traced to 1973, when S.B. 1336, a bill designed to equalize the rights of
nonmarital children with those of marital children, was introduced in
the State Senate. Following its passage by the Senate in early 1974, it
was amended at the request of the California Bar Association to incor-
porate the provisions of the Uniform Act. Action on the bill was
deferred for study of the amendments, and the bill was reintroduced by
its author in 1975 as S.B. 347. The bill as finally passed by the,
legislature in September 1975 included major amendments proposed by
the State Department of Health's adoption units and vital statistics
section, as well as suggestions by the State Bar's Family Law Committee
and the California Family Support Council.81
In considering the significance of California's adoption of the
Uniform Parentage Act, it is necessary to keep in mind that California
did not pass the act in toto. Several lengthy portions of the commission-
ers' draft were excluded in S.B. 347.11 However, S.B. 347 did adopt,
78. Id. § 2.
79. Id. §§ 4-6. Section 4 sets out five situations in which a man is presumed to
be a child's natural father. These provisions are dealt with at length in the succeeding
pages of this Note. See notes 84-88 & accompanying text infra.
Section 5 provides that "if, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with
the consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by
a man not her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural father
of a child thereby conceived." The husband's written consent must be filed with the
State Department of Health where it will be kept in a sealed file. Records are available
for inspection only upon court order for good cause shown.
Section 6 contains provisions for bringing an action to determine the existence of
the father and child relationship. This section is also considered in depth later in the
text. See notes 91-93 & accompanying text infra.
80. UNIFORM PARENTAGE AcT § 21 provides: "Any interested party may bring an
action to determine the existence or non-existence of a mother and child relationship.
Insofar as practicable, the provisions of this Act applicable to the father and child rela-
tionship apply."
81. Statement of Senator Anthony C. Beilenson regarding Senate Bill No. 347,
August 7, 1975, in author's files.
82. Among the deletions was section 7 of the national Uniform Act which pro-
vides a three-year statute of limitations for actions to determine the existence of a father
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without change, the definition of the "parent and child relationship" and
its application to all parents and children.83 It also retained, with
modification and deletions, major provisions concerning presumptions
of paternity, determination of the father and child relationship by court
action, jurisdiction and court procedures, notice of adoption, and termi-
nation of parental rights.
The discussion that follows will concentrate on the procedural
problems which can be expected to persist under the modified law. For
the sake of clarity, the inquiry will be broken down into sections
concerning presumptions, legitimation, and adoption and custody.
Presumptions
As is true of the commissioners' proposal, S.B. 347 first sets up a
series of presumptions to cover those cases where external circumstances
point toward a particular man as the father of a child.84 Under these
provisions, a man is presumed to be a child's father in the following
situations:
1) Evidence Code section 621: Unless a husband is impotent or
sterile, he is conclusively presumed to be the father of any children
and child relationship as to a child with no presumed father. The minutes of the State
Bar Committee on Family Law indicate that its members voted to omit the provision
because it was "unnecessary and of questionable constitutionality." Combined Minutes,
Committee on Family Law, May 3, 1975 and June 14, 1975, at 2. Presumably, the Leg-
islature acquiesced in this suggestion. The California legislation thus contains no statute
of limitations with regard to establishing the existence of a father and child relationship
where there is no presumed father.
Also omitted in S.B. 347 were sections 10 through 13 of the Uniform Act, providing
details for mandatory pretrial hearings. Admissible in these proceedings would be blood
tests and other evidence relating to paternity, including evidence of sexual intercourse,
experts' opinions concerning the statistical probability of the alleged father's paternity
based on duration of the pregnancy, and medical and anthropological evidence relating
to paternity. On the basis of information produced in the hearing, the judge conducting
the proceedings would recommend an appropriate settlement; if any party refused to ac-
cept the recommendation, the action would be set for trial. The drafters of the Uniform
Act expected that such pretrial procedures would "greatly reduce the current high cost
and inefficiency of paternity litigation." UNIFORM PARENTAGE AcT, Prefatory Note at
4.
Those who studied the measure in California prior to passage of S.B. 347 apparent-
ly did not agree. For example, members of the Committee on Family Law felt that
pretrial procedures were already available and that it was questionable that anyone
would consent to the new system. They considered that institution of such hearings
would be duplicative and would only increase the burden on the courts. Combined Min-
utes, Committee on Family Law, May 3, 1975 & June 14, 1975, at 2.
83. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 7001-02 (West Supp. 1976).
84. Section 7004 of the Civil Code corresponds generally with section 4 of the
Uniform Parentage Act. Where the California legislation differs from the Uniform Act,
such differences will be noted,
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conceived by his wife while ,he is living with her. 5
2) A man is rebuttably presumed to be the father of a child under
the following circumstances: s6
a) Civil Code section 7004(a)(1): If the child is born
during a marriage in which the husband and wife are not
cohabiting, or within 300 days of its legal termination;
7
b) Civil Code section 7004(a) (2): If, before the child's
birth, he and the mother have attempted to marry each other
and the child is born within 300 days of the termination of a
marriage that could be declared invalid only by court order,
or within 300 days of termination of cohabitation if the mar-
riage was invalid without the necessity of a court order;
c) Civil Code section 7004(a) (3): If, after the child's
birth, he and the mother marry or attempt to marry each
other and with his consent he is named as the father on the
birth certificate, or he is obligated to support the child under
a written voluntary promise or by court order;
d) Civil Code section 7004(a) (4): If he receives the child
into his home and openly holds it out as his natural child.
These new provisions for the most part simply reiterate existing
California law.8 S.B. 347 expressly retained the conclusive presump-
tion of Evidence Code section 621, adding a sterility exception and
removing reference to "legitimacy."8' 9 Section 7004(a)(1) of the new
85. This section was amended by S.B. 347 to include the judicially created sterility
exception. CAL. Evm. CODE § 621 (West 1966 & Supp. 1976).
86. Except as provided in section 621 of the Evidence Code, presumptions under
section 7004 of the California Civil Code may be rebutted by clear and convincing evi-
dence. If two or more presumptions under this section conflict, "the presumption which
on the facts is founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic controls."
CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004(b) (West Supp. 1976).
87. The statute itself does not specifically mention cohabitation. It simply pro-
vides that a man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if "[hie and the child's
natural mother are or have been married to each other and the child is born during the
marriage, or within 300 days after the marriage is terminated by death, annulment, dec-
laration of invalidity, or divorce, or after a decree of separation is entered by a court."
CAL. CIv. CODE § 7004(a)(1) (West Supp. 1976), amending Cal. Stat. 1965, ch. 299,
§ 1, at 3013.
88. The commissioners provide a fifth presumption not adopted in California.
Under it, a man is presumed to be the father of a child if he acknowledges his paternity
in a writing filed with an appropriate court or vital statistics bureau, and the mother
does not dispute the acknowledgement. If another man is presumed to be the child's
father under one of the other four presumptions, acknowledgement can be effected only
with such person's written consent or after the presumption has been rebutted. As with
all of the presumptions in the commissioners' draft, this presumption is rebuttable only
by clear and convincing evidence. UNFOnRM PARENTAGE Acr § 4(a) (5).
89. Cal. Stat. 1975, ch. 1244, § 13, at - (codified at CAL. Evm. CODE § 621
(West Supp. 1976)).
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legislation, which provides for a rebuttable presumption where a child is
born during marriage or within 300 days of its termination, is essentially
a restatement of Evidence Code section 661. The previous discussion
of these Evidence Code presumptions9" thus remains relevant to an
understanding of the problems the unwed father continues to face in
California.
The putative father's opportunities to raise the issue of paternity
remain limited. The new Civil Code section 7006 deals with the action
to determine whether a father and child relationship exists. It restricts
attack on the presumptions of paternity based on marriage or attempted
marriage91 to a limited group. Only the child, the natural mother, or a
man presumed to be the father of the child by reason of marriage may
bring an action to declare or dispute the existence or nonexistence of the
father and child relationship. 92 This means that where the mother is or
has been married within the previous 300 days, it will be difficult, if not
impossible, for a man other than her husband to raise the paternity
issue. The options open to a man claiming to be the father of a child
where the child already has a presumed father are few. He may try to
convince the child, the mother or the mother's husband to bring an
action or he may allege that he "legitimated" the child under section
7004(a) (4) and is himself a presumed father.9 3  Where he is unsuc-
cessful in establishing his standing, the presumptions of section
7004(a)(1), (2), and (3) will operate as conclusive presumptions as
to him, much in the way that Evidence Code section 661 operated
before In re Lisa R.94
The court in Lisa did question the constitutionality of use of this
type of presumption to frustrate the unwed father's attempts to present
90. See notes 48-73 & accompanying text supra.
91. The presumptions based on marriage or attempted marriage are those con-
tained in section 7004(a)(1)-(3) of the Civil Code. See text accompanying notes 84-
87 supra.
92. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7006(a) (West Supp. 1976). These are the same persons
who were empowered to contest the rebuttable presumption of the old Evidence Code
section 661. See note 50 & accompanying text supra.
The new legislation also provides that: "The district attorney may also bring an
action under [Civil Code section 7006] in any case in which he believes that the inter-
ests of justice will be served thereby." CAL. CIV. CODE § 7006(f) (West Supp. 1976).
Presumably, this provision will come into play when the state seeks to enforce parental
support obligations. The commissioners' draft of the Uniform Parentage Act does not
include this section, but Evidence Code section 661 provided that the presumption of
legitimacy could be disputed by the state in criminal actions brought under Penal Code
section 270 (nonsupport statute). Cal. Stat. 1965, ch. 299, § 661, at 1297 (repealed
1975).
93. The "legitimation" provision of section 7004(a)(4) is discussed later in the
text. See text accompanying notes 110-19 infra.
94. 13 Cal. 3d 636, 532 P.2d 123, 119 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975).
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evidence of his paternity. However, as was noted in the previous
discussion of the case,95 it is unclear whether such a constitutional
argument will be accepted by the court in cases where the mother and
the presumed father are still alive. At least some proponents of the
Uniform Parentage Act in California apparently believe that Lisa is
applicable only to cases in which the presumed father is dead. As
adopted, S.B. 347 includes a provision dealing with paternity suits that
is not contained in the original Uniform Parentage Act. The new Civil
Code section 7006(c) reads as follows:
An action to determine the existence of the father and child
relationship with respect to a child who has no presumed father
under Section 7004 or whose presumed father is deceased may be
brought by the child . .. , the State Department of Health, the
mother . . ., [or], a man alleged or alleging himself to be the
father . . .
The minutes of the California Bar Association's Committee on Family
Law indicate that the language pertaining to the deceased presumed
father was intended "to cover the In re Lisa situation."97  Committee
members, as well as the authors of S.B. 347, thus seemed to feel that
addition of such a section was an adequate response to the due process
arguments posited by the Lisa court.
A precise prediction as to how the courts will interpret the pre-
sumptions of section 7006 in light of Stanley and Lisa is, of course,
impossible. While both cases offer hope of expansion of all putative
fathers' rights, it must be borne in mind that both concerned particular
sets of facts which invited sympathetic treatment by the courts. In
Stanley, there was no presumed father the unwed father had lived with
his children for years and had always maintained a familial relationship
with them. Their mother had died, which meant that if the children
were taken from Stanley's care, they would be placed with strangers.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court's decision in the case can be read as
essentially continuing a "common theme which runs through the cases,
those concerning both legitimate and illegitimate children . . . that an
established family relationship is ordinarily to be preferred and protect-
ed."98  In Lisa the child had not lived with her putative father for
several years and had, in fact, formed an attachment to foster parents
who wished to adopt her. However, both the mother and the presumed
father had died, leaving Lisa with only her putative father as her
"natural" family. The California court was strongly influenced by the
95. See notes 51-58 & accompanying text supra.
96. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7006(c) (West Supp. 1976) (emphasis added).
97. Committee on Family Law, Combined Minutes, May 3, 1975 and June 14,
1975, at 2.
98. In re Mark T., 8 Mich. App. 122, 141, 154 N.W.2d 27, 36 (1967).
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Supreme Court's recognition in Stanley of substantial rights in unwed
fathers premised on "the rights to conceive and to raise one's chil-
dren." 99  Hence the Lisa court emphasized evidence indicating that
Lisa's father had "already legitimatized"' 0 her pursuant to Civil Code
section 230.
The unwed father who cannot show any of the elements found in
Stanley and Lisa-legitimation, nonexistence or death of a presumed
father, and maternal unfitness or death-appears to be without recourse
to challenge the presumptions of Civil Code section 7004. It is diffi-
cult, but necessary, to balance this apparent inequity with the rights of
the other persons involved in these cases. In opposition to the vesting of
unrestricted rights in the unwed father is a social policy that seeks to
protect the interests of children, whether born in or out of wedlock, to
stable home environments, parental support, and equality of legal status.
Also, the rights of the unmarried mother to custody, privacy, and free-
dom from social stigma must be guarded.1 1 In light of these consider-
ations, it is doubtful that courts will move with much speed in further
expanding putative fathers' rights to challenge rebuttable pre-
sumptions.
This is, of course, especially true of cases arising under the conclu-
sive presumption of Evidence Code section 621 .102 As mentioned
previously, 10 3 the legislature again retained this presumption in S.B.
347, adding a sterility exception and eliminating reference to legitima-
cy.' The new California scheme once again makes no mention of a
blood test exception to operation of the presumption, and the courts"
must continue to apply the reasoning of past decisions to prevent
presentation of such evidence on the issue of paternity.0 5 While as-
saults on section 621 have so far proven unsuccessful, continued at-
tempts to encourage the courts to evade the presumption where its
application will produce results clearly contrary to nature seem to be the
only available alternative.
In attacking section 621, aggrieved putative fathers may contend
that operation of the presumption where rebuttal evidence exists de-
99. In re Lisa R., 13 Cal. 3d 636, 648, 532 P.2d 123, 130, 119 Cal. Rptr. 475,
482 (1975), citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
100. 13 Cal. 3d at 648 n.14, 532 P.2d at 131, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 482.
101. For a commentary from this point of view, see Wallach & Tenoso, A Vindica-
tion of the Rights of Unmarried Mothers and Their Children: An Analysis of the Insti-
tution of Illegitimacy, Equal Protection, and the Uniform Parentage Act, 23 U. KANS.
L. REv. 23 (1974).
102. See notes 59-69 & accompanying text supra.
103. See note 85 & accompanying text supra.
104. Not everyone agreed with this decision. The California Bar Association's
Committee on Family Law, for example, voted to repeal section 621 in its entirety.
Committee on Family Law, Combined Minutes, May 3, 1975 & June 14, 1975, at 4.
105. See notes 65-73 & accompanying text supra.
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prives husbands and fathers of their fourteenth amendment due
process rights, in that it cannot be overcome by any evidence other than
that showing impotence, sterility, or non-cohabitation, regardless of how
persuasive it might be. It thus denies these men the opportunity for a
fair hearing of their cases. Moreover, arbitrary application of the pres-
umption by the courts, in the face of evidence that would conclusively
refute the presumption, is arguably a denial of equal protection. 106  As
the Supreme Court emphasized in Stanley:
Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than indi-
vidualized determination. But when. . . the procedure forecloses
the determinative issues . . . when it explicitly disdains present
realities in deference to past formalities, it needlessly risks running
roughshod over the important interests of both parent and child.10 7
Conclusive presumptions of legitimacy had their genesis in public
policy considerations that favored mitigation of the stigma of illegitima-
cy at a time when scientific evidence relating to paternity was nonexist-
ent. With changing social attitudes and increasing scientific knowl-
edge, continued use of such presumptions appears to be unwarranted.
Legitimation
As observed earlier,0 8 Civil Code section 230 had controlled the
legitimation of nonmarital children by their fathers. In enacting S.B.
347, California repealed section 230 in favor of the somewhat more
liberal provision of the Uniform Parentage Act. As set out in the new
Civil Code section 7004(a)(4), the simplified procedure presumes a
man to be the natural father of a child if he receives the child into his
home and openly acknowledges him as his own. Gone is the necessity
of obtaining the permission of the man's wife, if he is married. And
since In re Richard M.,119 courts are no longer free to read into the law
any requirement of consent on the part of the child's mother.
The legitimation presumption raised under section 7004(a)(4) is
rebuttable only by clear and convincing proof." 0 According to section
7006(b) of the new legislation, any interested party may bring an action
to determine whether a parent and child relationship does or does not
exist under the section. Since such an action may be brought prior to
the child's birth,"' the courts are free to adopt the reasoning of Lavell v.
106. For a lengthy discussion of the constitutional issues raised by section 621, see
Comment, California's Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy-Its Legal Effect and Its
Questionable Constitutionality, 35 S. CAL. L. REv. 437 (1962).
107. 405 U.S. at 656-57.
108. See note 37 & accompanying text supra.
109. 14 Cal. 3d 783, 537 P.2d 363, 122 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1975). See notes 43-46
& accompanying text supra.
110. CAL. CIrv. CODE § 7004(b) (West Supp. 1976).
111. Id. § 7006(e).
September 19761 UNIEFORM PARENTAGE ACT
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Adoption Institute"1 2 to presume parentage where the unmarried par-
ents are living together at the time of probable conception and where the
putative father publicly acknowledges his paternity.
One stumbling block remaining in this legislative scheme is the
requirement that the father receive the child into his home. Although
the court in Richard M. painstakingly attempted to clarify the issue, the
meaning of the reception requirement remains unclear. Stressing the
public policy favoring "legitimation" and urging a liberal construction
of the former section 230, the court in Richard M. reasoned that the
requirement is "satisfied by evidence that the father accepted the child
as his own, usually demonstrated by an actual physical acceptance of the
child into the father's home to the extent possible under the particular
circumstances of the case."' 1 3 The court pointed out a number of cases
in which the father's relationship with his child was rather tenuous. For
example, in Hurst v. Hurst," 4 one of the cases cited by the court, the
unwed father rented an apartment in his name and the names of the
mother and child. The court held that this conduct satisfied the statute
although the father himself never resided in the apartment with the
mother and child.
Richard M. also recognized that prenatal legitimation, occasional
temporary visits, and constructive reception, such as seeing the child in
the mother's home, had fulfilled the requirement of section 2 3 0 .115
Presumably, this reasoning would carry over to cases under the new
section 7004(a)(4). It may be significant, however, that in most of
these cases the father had seen his child, however fleetingly. A question
still exists, therefore, as to whether the "reception" requirement will be
satisfied in cases in which the father has not lived with the mother, is
unable to acquire even temporary physical control of the child, and is
not permitted to see it." 6  Under such circumstances, if there is no
112. 185 Cal. App. 2d 557, 8 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1960). See text accompanying notes
38-41 supra.
113. 14 Cal. 3d at 794, 537 P.2d at 369, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 537.
114. 227 Cal. App. 2d 859, 39 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1964).
115. 14 Cal. 3d at 792-95, 537 P.2d at 368-70, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 536-38; accord,
Lavell v. Adoption Institute, 185 Cal. App. 2d 557, 8 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1960) (legitima-
lion); Estate of Peterson, 214 Cal. App. 2d 258, 29 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1963); Estate of
Wilson, 164 Cal. App. 2d 385, 330 P.2d 452 (1958); Estate of Jones, 166 Cal. 108,
135 P. 288 (1913) (visits); Estate of Maxey, 257 Cal. App. 2d 391, 64 Cal. Rptr. 837
(1967) (constructive reception).
116. The court in Richard M. noted that Blythe v. Ayres, 96 Cal. 532, 31 P. 915
(1892), probably went farthest in liberally construing the reception requirement. The
father there was held to have satisfied the statute without ever actually having seen his
child, although he openly acknowledged her and corresponded with her for several years.
In commenting on the case, the Richard M. court found it "noteworthy that this deter-
mination was subsequently criticized by this court in Estate of De Laveaga (1904) 142
Cal. 158, 169-70." 14 Cal. 3d at 795 n.9, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 538. It does not seem
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presumed father or if the presumed father is dead, the putative father
will be able to bring an action under Civil Code section 7006(c) to seek
a declaration of his paternity.. 7 If he is successful in establishing his
paternity under this section, he will have accomplished the same result
as if he had "legitimated" the child-that is, he will have assumed the
rights, privileges, and obligations of parenthood.
Where a presumed father exists, however, the unwed father who is
unable to "legitimate" his child under Civil Code section 7004(a)(4)
would appear to be without a remedy. As discussed in the preceding
section on presumptions,118 only the child, its mother, or a man pre-
sumed to be the child's father by reason of marriage may bring an action
to dispute the presumption of paternity that arises if the mother is or has
been married.119 Thus, unless the putative father is able somehow to
obtain either temporary custodial or visitation rights, he cannot himself
become a presumed father through "legitimation" of his offspring and
will thus be unable to proceed in court to challenge the presumed
father's paternity.
Adoption and Custody
Problems also arise with respect to the non-marital father's rights in
adoption and custody proceedings. The Supreme Court in Stanley
identified in the natural father an ill-defined right to the custody of his
children.120  Unfortunately, the court did not indicate with precision the
boundaries of that right, the instances in which it comes into play, or
the circumstances under which the court can deprive a putative father
of that right.
To acquire custody of his child under the Uniform Parentage Act,
the unwed father must first establish the existence of a father and child
relationship.' 2' He may accomplish this in several ways. He may
certain, therefore, that the court would now accept a holding such as Blythe v. Ayres.
The closest a man could come to legitimating his child without visitation would obvious-
ly be through prenatal legitimation, which seems to require that he live with the mother
for a period of time prior to the child's birth.
117. This provision reads: "An action to determine the existence of the father and
child relationship with respect to a child who has no presumed father under Section 7004
or whose presumed father is deceased may be brought by the child, or personal represen-
tative of the child, the State Department of Health, the mother or the personal represen-
tative or a parent of the mother if the mother has died or is a minor, a man alleged
or alleging himself to be the father, or the personal representative or a parent of the
alleged father if the alleged father has died or is a minor." CAL. Civ. CODE § 7006(c)
(West Supp. 1976). See notes 90-92 & accompanying text supra.
118. See note 92 & accompanying text supra.
119. CAL. Crv. CoDE § 7006(a) (1)-(2) (West Supp. 1976).
120. 405 U.S. 645, 651-52 (1972).
121. CAL. Cv. CoDE § 7003(2) (West Supp. 1976).
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become a presumed father by marrying the child's mother either before
or after the birth. 12 2  As indicated above, he may become a presumed
father by receiving the child into his home and openly acknowledging it
as his own. 123  Alternatively, if there is no presumed father, he may
bring a paternity action in superior court under Civil Code section
7006(c) to establish the relationship.1
2 4
The child is a mandatory party to any action to establish the parent
and child relationship. 125  The mother, presumed father, and each man
alleged to be the father may be made parties and shall be given notice
and an opportunity to be heard. 126  These provisions are intended to
meet the due process requirements of Stanley. Furthermore, the hear-
ing or trial may be held in closed court, and all papers and records
pertaining to the action, other than the final judgment, are subject to
inspection only in exceptional cases upon court order for good cause
shown. 27  Judgment in such a suit may contain appropriate provisions
concerning support obligations, custody, and visitation privileges. 28
This judgment is determinative for all purposes except criminal non-
support actions.
129
Thus, the putative father who is able to take advantage of the
paternity proceeding would be able to request custody, whether he
himself institutes the suit under section 7006(c)' or the child, mother,
122. Id. § 7004(a)(2)-(3).
123. Id. § 7004(a)(4).
124. Id. § 7006(c).
125. Id. § 7008. The child is a mandatory party because he is regarded as the
real party in interest.
126. Id. Section 9 of the commissioners' draft provides that the mother, each man
presumed to be the father and each man alleged to be the father shall also be mandatory
parties. This provision was opposed in California by the Family Support Council, a
group composed of members of the attorney general's office, district attorneys and their
investigators, probation officers, and welfare personnel. Its opposition arose from the
belief that requiring so many mandatory parties would make it more difficult to try a
paternity action or to settle the case, causing delay in establishing the parent and child
relationship. This view apparently prevailed. Letter from Maureen K. Lenahan,
Deputy District Attorney of Alameda County to Senator Anthony C. Beilenson, May
20, 1975, in author's files.
127. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7014 (West Supp. 1976). The commissioners required that
these hearings be held in closed court. Such a requirement was regarded with disfavor
in California on the grounds that "open trials are designed in part to prevent arbitrary
and abusive court proceedings," and the public's interest in preserving its right to view
court actions and thus control their fairness is of greater importance than providing se-
crecy for the parties. Closing of the courtroom to outsiders was accordingly made dis-
cretionary. Bill Digest, Assembly Committee on Judiciary, at 7-8.
128. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7010(c) (West Supp. 1976).
129. Id. § 7010(a). The judgment of the court in a civil proceeding is not deter-
minative in a criminal action because the standard of proof is greater in a criminal
proceeding.
130. Id. § 7006(c) (West Supp. 1976).
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or presumed father does so under section 7006(a)(2). 131 Once his
paternity is established, his status becomes that of the child's legal, as
well as biological, father, with rights and duties equal to those of the
child's mother. The court should then base its award of custody on
considerations of parental fitness and the best interests of the child.13 2 In
addition to the ability of each parent to provide a suitable home and
adequate financial support for the child, a dominant factor in the court's
determination would be the child's present living situation. In the past
courts have been reluctant to uproot a child who has an established
home in which he is emotionally well-adjusted and well-cared for.133
Also, where the mother is fit, many courts have shown a bias in favor of
maternal custody, particularly where very young children are in-
volved. 34 However, as social attitudes toward male and female roles
change and more fathers actively participate in rearing their children, a
gradual adjustment of judicial views can be expected to accommodate
the interests of fathers who seek custody of their children. Even before
these societal changes occur, visitation privileges will doubtless be
readily granted to legal fathers who can demonstrate their fitness.
These opportunities for custody and visitation rights will be denied
to those men who seek custody of a child with a living presumed father.
As was discussed previously, 35 the unwed father may undertake a court
action to determine the existence of the father and child relationship
only when there is no presumed father, unless he can "legitimate" the
child under section 7004(a)(4). Absent the cooperation of one of the
other parties involved, he will be unable to establish his paternity and
will therefore be foreclosed from asserting custodial rights.
In the case of adoptions, the situation has improved somewhat for
unwed fathers, as the Uniform Parentage Act makes several changes in
the law in recognition of Stanley. Under prior law, the unwed father
had no statutory right to notice of adoption proceedings and his consent
to the adoption of his child was unnecessary. 3 6  S.B. 347 provides
some advances in this area.
As was true under the superseded statutes, a child who has a
presumed father, either by reason of marriage or through "legitimation,"
131. See note 92 & accompanying text supra.
132. The "best interests of the child" is the traditional test employed by courts in
determining the disposition of adoption and custody cases. See, e.g., Tabler, Paternal
Rights in the Illegitimate Child: Some Legitimate Complaints on Behalf of the Unwed
Father, 11 J. FAMILY L. 242 (1971).
133. See generally Comment, Disposition of the Illegitimate Child-Father's Right
to Notice, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 232 (1968).
134. See Note, Paternal Custody of Minor Children, 5 MEMpmS ST. U.L. RPv. 223
(1975).
135. See notes 91-94, 118-119 & accompanying text supra.
136. See note 35 & accompanying text supra.
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cannot be placed for adoption without the consent of both parents."' If
the mother proposes to relinquish the child for adoption, the presumed
father must be given notice and may prevent the adoption by withhold-
ing his consent. 1
38
However, if the mother relinquishes a child who has no presumed
father, the agency or person to whom the child has been relinguished or
the mother or person having custody of the child, must file a petition to
terminate formally the parental rights of the father.'3 9 This is also true
if the child otherwise becomes the subject of adoption proceedings-for
example, upon the mother's death-and the alleged father has not
denied paternity, waived his right to notice, or voluntarily relinquished
or consented to the adoption. 4 ° In such situations, the court must
require that an effort to identify the natural father be made by the State
Department of Health or the adoption agency.' 4 ' If the natural father is
identified following this inquiry, or if more than one man is identified as
a possible father, each must be given notice of the adoption proceed-
ing.142 The parental rights of possible fathers will be terminated should
137. CAL. CIV. CODE § 224 (West Supp. 1976). There are some exceptions to this
general rule. If one parent has been awarded custody of the child and the other parent,
for a period of one year, willfully fails to communicate with and pay for the care of
such child When able to do so, then the custodial parent alone may consent to adoption
after the noncustodial parent has been notified and required to appear in court. Consent
is not required of a parent who has been judicially deprived of custody and control of
the child, where a parent has deserted the child, or where a parent has relinquished the
child for adoption.
138. This is true unless the father's relationship to the child has been previously
terminated or determined by a court not to exist, or the father has voluntarily relin-
quished the child or consented to adoption, or neglect or disinterest is shown. CAL. CIV.
CODE § 7017(a) (West Supp. 1976).
139. Id. § 7017(b). It was considered necessary by the drafters of the Uniform
Parentage Act to make provision for formal termination of parental rights to protect the
integrity of the adoption process and render the adoption of a child immune to attack.
See UNIFORM PARENTAGE AcT § 25, Comment.
140. CAL. Ctv. CODE § 7017(b) (West Supp. 1976).
141. The inquiry must include whether the mother was married; whether she was
cohabiting with a man at the time of conception; whether she has received support pay-
ments; or whether any man has formally or informally acknowledged his possible pa-
ternity. Id. § 7017(c).
142. Id. § 7017(d). Notice requirements are governed by subdivision (f) of sec-
tion 7017, which reads: "Notice of the proceedings shall be given to every person identi-
fied as the natural father or a possible natural father in accordance with the provisions
of the Code of Civil Procedure for the service of process in a civil action in this state,
provided that publication or posting of the notice of the proceeding shall not be required.
Proof of giving of the notice shall be filed with the court before the petition is heard.
However, if a person identified as the natural father or possible natural father cannot be
located or his whereabouts are unknown or cannot be ascertained, the court may issue
an order dispensing with notice to such person."
The commissioners' draft contains an optional provision leaving to the court's dis-
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any of them fail to appear, or appearing, fail to claim custodial rights.'43
Problems may arise under the statute when a man alleging that he
is the child's natural father actually appears to claim custodial rights.
Where the father seeks custody, the court is empowered to determine
parentage and custodial rights in the sequence it deems proper.144  If it
finds that the man claiming custody is a presumed father, either by
reason of marriage to the child's mother'4 5 or through legitimation, 146
the court must order that his consent to the adoption is required.' 47
However, where the man cannot prove that he is a presumed father, the
court will order that only the mother's consent is necessary. 48
This means that a narrow application of the statute could potential-
ly leave the unwed father who has not become a presumed father under
section 7004(a) in virtually the same unfavorable position he occupied
cretion a decision on whether publication or public posting of notice is likely to lead
to identification of the natural father. The comment to section 25 of the draft notes
that a consequence of publication in all cases is that "some mothers may be caused to
withhold their children from adoption even where adoption would be in the child's best
interest" to avoid the embarrassment of publication. UNIFORM PARENTAGE AcT § 25-
56.
It is questionable whether Stanley requires notice by publication where the father's
whereabouts are unknown. The problems inherent in the notice procedures have been
fully discussed in several recent articles. E.g., Comment, Protecting the Putative
Father's Rights After Stanley v. Illinois: Problems in Implementation, 13 J. FAMILY L.
115 (1973-74); Note, The Emerging Constitutional Protection of the Putative Father's
Parental Rights, 70 MICH. L REv. 1581 (1972); Note, The "Strange Boundaries" of
Stanley: Providing Notice of Adoption to the Unknown Putative Father, 59 VA. L. REv.
517 (1973). These commentators agree that some procedural limitation of Stanley is
likely to protect the interests of the state and of the child in securing the adoption proc-
ess. It remains to be seen whether California's notice provision, which does not re-
quire publication in any case, will be regarded by the courts as sufficient to meet the
requirements of Stanley.
143. CAL. Civ. CODE § 7017(d) (West Supp. 1976).
144. Id.
145. Id. § 7004(a)(1)-(3).
146. Id. § 7004(a)(4). See text accompanying notes 108-119 supra.
147. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7017(d) (West Supp. 1976). The provision that the
father's consent to adoption is required represents a substantial addition to the commis-
sioners' version of the Uniform Parentage Act. The procedure is as follows: "If, after
the inquiry, the natural father is identified to the satisfaction of the court, or if more
than one man is identified as a possible father, each shall be given notice of the proceed-
ing. . . . If any of them fails to appear or, if appearing, fails to claim custodial rights,
his parental rights with reference to the child shall be terminated. If the natural father
or a man representing himself to be the natural father, claims custodial rights, the court
shall proceed to determine custodial rights." UNm'ORM PARENTAGE ACT § 25(c). The
comment to the section notes that if the alleged father is found fit to have custody, an
action to ascertain paternity is indicated unless a voluntary acknowledgement can be ob-
tained.
148. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7017(d) (West Supp. 1976).
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before enactment of the Uniform Act.14 9 However, the statute does
afford the courts a method of alleviating the problem where justice
requires. As pointed out, the court has the power to determine paren-
tage and custodial rights in whatever order it deems proper. 5 ' There-
fore, to protect the rights of the unwed father who can demonstrate both
his paternity and his fitness to assume custody, the court may award
custody to him. This would allow him to accomplish legitimation under
section 7004(a)(4) and render him a presumed father. His consent
would then be required before his child could be released for adoption.
The father whose paternity has been established in a prior proceed-
ing faces no problem under this section. The adjudication of the issue
of the existence of the parent and child relationship in such an action is
determinative for nearly all purposes and his consent to adoption would
thus be required.' 51
Summary: Advantages of the Uniform Parentage Act
The foregoing discussion has emphasized some of the interpretative
problems that may be encountered under the Uniform Parentage Act as
it was adopted in California. However, the act is not without strengths
and it makes several important advances.
The most obvious of these is the act's deletion of statutory refer-
ence to illegitimacy. This represents the first attempt by the legislature
to erase the stigma that has so long been associated with out-of-wedlock
birth. While a change in language alone cannot accomplish substantive
legal adjustments, it does reflect an awareness of changing life styles and
altered societal attitudes.
A second advance accomplished by this legislation is its measures
providing limited protection, for the first time, of the efforts of the
unwed father to assume responsibility for his children. Under the new
law, he is entitled to notice of any proceedings that affect his parental
rights and he may appear in court to seek custody when his child is
relinquished by the mother for adoption. As under prior code sections,
when no presumed father exists, the unwed father may bring an action
to assert his paternity.' 5 2 Furthermore, the new law makes it easier for
149. This problem was brought to the attention of the legislature prior to passage
of S.B. 347. Bill Digest, Assembly Committee on Judiciary, prepared for hearing date
August 14, 1975, at 9.
150. Civil Code section 7017(d) provides: "If the natural father or a man repre-
senting himself to be the natural father, claims custodial rights, the court shall proceed
to determine parentage and custodial rights in whatever order the court deems proper."
151. See note 129 & accompanying text supra.
152. The former Civil Code section 231 provided for inverse paternity actions. Cal.
Stat. 1921, ch. 136, § 1, at 137 (repealed 1975). This is now possible under CAL. Civ.
CODE § 7006(c) (West Supp. 1976).
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him to become a presumed father himself. The abolition of the require-
ment of obtaining his wife's consent when he wishes to bring his
nonmarital children into his home represents a victory and will make it
easier for many fathers to establish parental relationships with their
children.'
53
A third advance, not previously touched upon, is the act's amend-
ment of the Probate Code to allow nonmarital children to inherit from
and through their father once the father and child relationship has been
established.'" Thus, under the new law, nonmarital parents and chil-
dren have inheritance rights equal to those enjoyed by marital families.
Summary: Persistent Problems Under the Uniform
Parentage Act
As this note has attempted to illustrate, it is in its procedural
aspects that the Uniform Parentage Act falls short of establishing com-
plete equality for the nonmarital father. The major problems facing the
putative father who wishes to assert his parental rights may be summa-
rized as follows:
Standing
If a child's mother is married at the time of conception, her
husband is presumed to be the child's legal father, 5" and an unmar-
ried man who alleges paternity of the child generally cannot bring
an action to challenge this presumption. As to him, the presumption is
conclusive. Stanley v. Illinois5 " and In re Lisa R.' 57 stand for the
proposition that such "procedure by presumption" is unacceptable as a
denial of the putative father's constitutional rights, at least in those
instances where no presumed father exists and the mother is dead or
unfit to care for the child. It will be left to future courts to determine
how far the holdings of those cases will be extended to include situations
in which a presumed father is living and willing to assume custody of his
wife's child.
One hopes that the courts will bear in mind that the interests of the
child may very well best be served by allowing the unwed father to
153. Difficulties often arose in the past, even when the unwed father and his wife
although still married, had not been living together for some time. See, e.g., Adoption
of Graham, 58 Cal. 2d 899, 377 P.2d 275, 27 Cal. Rptr. 163 (1962).
154. CAL. PROB. CODE § 255 (West Supp. 1976), amending Cal. Stat. 1931, ch. 281,
§ 255, at 599.
155. See note 87 & accompanying text supra.
156. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). For a discussion of the case, see notes 27-30 & accom-
panying text supra.
157. 13 Cal. 3d 636, 532 P.2d 123, 119 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975). For a discussion
of the case, see notes 51-56 & accompanying text supra.
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freely contest the presumptions raised by Civil Code section 7004. It is
difficult-if not ridiculous-to imagine droves of litigious unmarried
men coming into court to demand that they be allowed to assume
parental rights and obligations to children who are biological strangers
to them. Rather, it seems reasonable to suppose that only those men
with a genuine interest in a child would care to spend the time and
money involved in pursuing a paternity action. Should a court in fact
find a failure of good faith on the part of the unwed father, the best
interests of the child would be a basis for awarding custody to the
presumed father.
Conclusive Presumption of Evidence Code Section 621
Related to the issue of standing is the problem of Evidence Code
section 621, wherein it is stated that children born to a married woman
cohabiting with her husband are conclusively presumed to be the chil-
dren of the husband, unless he is shown to be sterile or impotent. No
other evidence of any kind is admissible to refute the presumption.
Original drafts of S.B. 347 provided for repeal of section 621, but
it was retained in the bill as enacted. Since transcripts of hearings held
on S.B. 347 are not available, it is not entirely clear why the legislature
saw fit to preserve such a controversial provision. It is assumed that its
retention serves to reiterate a legislative belief in a social policy that
stresses the importance of "legitimacy" of children. It is contended,
however, that continued emphasis on the concept of "legitimacy" is a
holdover from a male oriented culture that defined the legal status of its
children in terms of their paternity. Thus, the child whose father
married its mother enjoyed a legal status-symbolized by the child's
right to use his father's name-that was superior to that of the child
whose parents did not marry. The child's identity was closely connect-
ed to that of his father, as women had few rights or obligations to pass
on to their children. Lands were handed down through the father's
kindred; social status was conferred by reference to the father; children
bore their father's name. This patriarchal definition of the child's legal
status no longer seems appropriate, particularly in light of the stated
goal of the Uniform Parentage Act that "regardless of the marital status
of the parents, all children and all parents have equal rights with respect
to each other."'158 It should be recognized that all children are "legiti-
mate" simply by virtue of birth-rights cannot be parceled out to them
or to their parents on any basis other than complete equality.
Arguably, the legislature should have made California's laws con-
sistent with modern trends by eliminating Evidence Code section 621
158. UNIFORM PARENTAGE AcT §§ 1-2, Comment.
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altogether and making all presumptions of paternity rebuttable. Failing
that, legislative reform might have been directed toward responding to
the dicta of some early cases' 59 that would have provided a generalized
exception to operation of section 621 where circumstances rendered it
impossible for the husband to have fathered the child. This would have
effectively converted section 621 into a rebuttable presumption. A
more restrictive, but still desirable, approach would have been for the
legislature to specify particular exceptions to application of the section
in addition to impotence and sterility. Most important, it might have
added a blood test exception to make such tests admissible as evidence
when they clearly demonstrate that the husband could not be the child's
father.
The legislature, of course, adopted none of these approaches. It
thus remains up to the courts to refuse to apply section 621 when unjust
results would be obtained through its operation. Such a refusal could
be based upon constitutional considerations of due process and equal
protection.' 60
Adoption
Under the procedural provisions of the new Civil Code section
7006, a putative father's consent to adoption of his child is required only
if he can establish that he is a presumed father-i.e., that he is or was
married to the child's mother or that he has "legitimated" the child by
acknowledging it and accepting it into his home. To avoid foreclosing
the rights of putative fathers who have not been able to become "pre-
sumed" fathers, but who are nevertheless fit to assume custody, the
court may determine custodial rights prior to deciding the issue of
parentage. By awarding custody to the putative father, the court can
allow him to legitimate the child, thus equalizing his rights in the
adoption procedure with those of the child's mother.
The importance of the adoption system in providing secure and
loving home environments for children whose natural parents cannot or
do not wish to raise them is obvious. However, in our rush to insure the
stability and efficiency of the adoption process, it is apparent that the
rights of the parties involved-particularly the unwed father-may well
suffer. It may be instructive in this regard to consider the growing
awareness of adopted children who have undertaken to search for their
"real" parents in an attempt to discover their familial roots. Would it
not be fairer to all of the parties in an adoption proceeding to ensure that
the rights of the putative father who wants to assume custody of his
159. See note 64 supra.
160. For a discussion of this constitutional argument, see text accompanying notes
106-07 supra.
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child and is adjudged qualified to do so are protected? After all, it
makes no more sense to insist that all unwed fathers are disinterested
and unfit parents than it does to continue in the belief that all mothers
are by nature interested in raising children.
It is to be hoped that courts will weigh these considerations in
determining adoption issues.
Conclusion
Enactment of the Uniform Parentage Act in California may signal
the approach of an increasingly realistic and nonpunitive legal stance
toward unwed parents and their offspring. In a state in which the out-
of-wedlock birthrate annually exceeds 10 percent of total births, such a
restructuring of outmoded laws was surely long ovedue. But the new
law has not eliminated all of the problems faced by nonmarital families.
Perhaps as our society continues to adapt to new lifestyles and chal-
lenges to traditional male-female roles, our laws will begin to keep pace
with altered societal values.
We have a long way to go.
Diane C. Wilson*
* Member, Third Year Class
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